The international management of biodiversity by Stähler, Frank
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Stähler, Frank
Working Paper
The international management of
biodiversity
Kiel Working Papers, No. 529
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Stähler, Frank (1992) : The international management of biodiversity, Kiel
Working Papers, No. 529, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46719Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers





Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787The Kiel Institute of World Economics
Diisternbrooker Weg 120
D-W-2300Kiel.l, FRG





Abstract: The Earth Summit in Rio was expected to pave the way for more
and effective cooperation with respect to biodiversity. This paper
discusses the approaches which were adopted at the summit and the
benefits of biodiversity which are closely related to innovations of
the biotechnology industries. The paper shows that the project-
related support is principally able both to guarantee a certain
degree of preservation and to avoid administration problems which
originate from information asymmetries and rent-seeking. The
project-related control of environment-friendliness can serve as an
effective, although insufficient second-best instrument unless a
general pricing rule for different international environmental
services is available. However, the paper also shows that the
agreed-upon preferential access of developing countries to patented
biotechnology products will encounter a lot of problems.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel
Working Paper. Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticism and suggestions directly to
the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction: Biodiversity and the Earth Summit
The Earth Summit in Rio was expected to pave the way for more and
effective cooperation with respect to biodiversity. Natural scientists accuse
land- and forest-users that they are making hundreds of plants and animals
extinct year by year, not taking into account the potential productivity of these
species for the biosphere and human living conditions. An intensive use of
biospheres for timber production and agricultural purposes obviously conflicts
with a long-run survival of potentially decisive elements of the natural
environment. Natural scientists demand the abolishment of land uses which are
incompatible with long-run sustainability.
Biodiversity losses can be attributed to several externalities of economic
processes in the developing countries, especially of agriculture (see Swanson
(1992)) and other land developments. As a logical consequence, the summit
formulated a convention on biological diversity which is already signed by
many participants of the Rio Conference. This convention mentioned explicitly
the condition of sustainability for the resource uses which should serve as a
restriction on the national sovereignties in exploiting national resources. The
United States of America, however, refused to join the convention because the
Bush administration feared economic drawbacks for their domestic
biotechnology industry.
None of the conference participants expected that the developing
countries will afford resource conservation on their own. They accepted
biodiversity as a world-wide task and acknowledged the need of strong support
by the industrialized countries. Like in the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the industrialized countries declared to bear the
incremental costs to meet the diversity targets. They considered the
implementation of a special environmental fund which should be paid by the
developed countries. The negotiation sessions which prepared the Earth
Summit proposed that an agency should administer the environmental fund.
The draft convention did not contain any rules of demands and responsibilities
("to be decided on the conference"), so that the concrete allocation procedure
was a subject of controversial discussions.The developing countries also demanded "equitable and preferential
access ... to the results of research, the products developed and the benefits and
profits arising from the exploitation of the relevant genetic material".
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Biodiversity resources, especially agriculture and the tropical forests of
developing countries, provide a wide range of genetic material. For example,
the scientific use of genetic material induces a lottif innovations in the field of
seeds and pharmaceuticals. Until now, seed producers and the pharmaceutical
industry have exploited this genetic material of different plants and animals
free of charge. These industries which devote a huge amount of resources to
research and development are mostly sited in the developed countries. Hence,
the developing countries wanted to participate in the benefits of biodiversity-
related innovations. Thus, those developing countries which provide genetic
material demanded to "... be exempted from royalties on patents relating to the
products of this research". Patents, intellectual property rights and other
restrictions should not be imposed for this group of countries unless they
conflict with environmental objectives.
The biodiversity agreement of Rio reflects the general outcome of the
Earth Summit (see also Heister, Klepper, Stahler (1992)). The developing
countries did not succeed either in establishing different funds for different
environmental issues or in democratically deciding about the distribution.
Instead, countries have to apply for project-related support and the specialists
check the "biodiversity-friendliness" of these projects. The assessment of
specialists and the proposals which the assembly of the participants of the
convention brings forward serve as the decision basis. But essentially the
industrialized countries control the fund. They integrated the fund into the
already existing Global Environmental Facilities (GEF), which support also
other projects which enhance the global environmental quality. Additionally,
most of the industrialized countries agreed to a preferential access to
biotechnology products for participating developing countries. Because it was
also consensual among the industrialized countries to protect intellectual
property rights, transfers to the concerned firms will compensate them for their
research efforts.
The quotations in this section originate from the draft of the convention.A preliminary assessment of the several suggestions and the Rio
agreements with respect to biodiversity must focus on two major issues. On the
one hand, the protection of biodiversity does not represent a challenge which is
self-explaining in economic terms. Additionally, not only participants of the
Earth Suirimit disputed the organization of the fund. Academic proposals of a
fund which is solely - based on financial transfers and compensates
environmental protection conflict with the outcome of Rio, too. Therefore, a
preliminary assessment must analyse whether these proposals are superior with
respect to efficiency and long-run stability. On the other hand, biodiversity
serves as a crucial but still free input for several innovations in rapidly
increasing industries. Patent laws and other safeguards which are introduced to
protect against the free use of intellectual property rights incur several
problems of their own. These problems should be taken into account when the
parties agree to a preferential access for developing countries.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 concentrates on the
indeterminate value of biodiversity and the corresponding evaluation problems.
Section 3 discusses the role of an environmental fund. I will show that the
project conditionality of financial support is able to prevent possible
shortcomings of an insufficient system of purely financial transfers. Section 4
contains an analysis of the potential effects of a preferential access to
biotechnology products. Section 5 deals with the possibilities of reconciling the
demands of the biotechnology industries and those of the biodiversity resource
owners. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. The Indeterminate Value of Biodiversity
Any approach to value the benefits of biodiversity faces a lot of
determination problems. First of all, cost-benefit-assessments do not solely
dominate the discussion about biodiversity. The ethical question whether
human mankind has the right to decide on the survival of other living
organisms stands at the heart of the environmentalists' contest. Denying to
evaluate the survival of species in terms of mankind's benefits prohibits any
utilization of natural resources at the expense of other living organisms. Costs
and benefits which are subject of environmental economics do not play any
role for such an extreme conservation policy and should be irrelevant until this
policy definitely rules out any extinction.Such green ideas strongly influence the discussion on biodiversity and
render any standard approach useless (see also the general discussion in
Kneese, Schulze (1985)). The incompatibility of these approaches prevents an
integration in terms of supplementing conventional benefits unless, for
example, the tourist industry addresses the problems of wildlife protection as
an externality problem. The discussions on the conference mentioned explicitly
these "intrinsic values" although any acknowledgement of such values will
only be possible on a political but not on an academic basis. I refrain from
adopting this radical conservationists' view but I have to acknowledge that a lot
of political pressure originates from those extreme ideas. It is noteworthy that
in most cases such ideas come to the minds of inhabitants of highly developed
countries.
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The "conventional" benefits of biodiversity are at least twofold. On the
one hand, biodiversity lowers the research and development costs of
biotechnology industries significantly because it serves as a highly productive
in-situ-stock of genetic materials. On the other hand, biodiversity represents an
insurance for agriculture because it deminishes the risks of productivity
variations. Agriculture can rely on many instead of only a few species which
are themselves subject to natural risks. Again, seed producers which are a
special branch of the biotechnology industry are able to use a resource stock
which they cannot fully substitute by an expensive laboratory ex-situ-stock.
But there may exist other services of biodiversity as well. Because we are still
very ignorant with respect to the interdependences among several biospheres
and their elements, biodiversity could also ensure a high degree of adaptability
of all living organisms. Biodiversity could also serve as an insurance against
both natural global change and man-made environmental risks if this
hypothesis is true.
The dominant uncertainty with respect to the effects of human actions on
biodiversity would cause no special problem if a loss of biodiversity were
reversible. But extinction is irreversible.
3 So, if we are in doubt about the
Weitzman's (1991) interesting paper has just started the discussion about the
evaluation of a "utility-of-diversity-for-its-own-sake".
I was told that scientists are experimenting to reproduce extincted animals. They
plan to use gnats which had sucked the blood from these animals before amberbenefits, the protection of biodiversity has an option value. According to
Arrow and Fisher (1974), the potential learning effects in subsequent periods
which were useless when an irreversible development alternative is chosen -*
determine the option value. Weisbrod (1964) demonstrated that option values
are political and public issues when - besides uncertainty and irreversibility -
the resource owners are not able to trade the option value with uncertain future
users because the options are a public good. Prohibitive high transaction costs
render any exclusive access to genetic resources non-achievable, but
nowadays, the developing countries have other options to use those areas. Free
access was efficient in the past when biodiversity was a free good. Now, there
will be no longer any free lunch for innovators when only sacrifices in terms of
other utilizing opportunities can safeguard biodiversity in developing
countries. Additionally, the use of genetic products itself can worsen the
degree of biodiversity. The exploitation of genetic materials is negligible
because extractions for R&D do not change the stock of the biosphere
significantly, but some R&D-based products, especially for the agriculture, can
deteriorate the survival chances of natural species. Hence, it turns out that the
tropical forests as well as other areas which provide genetic material represent
a prototype of public option values. The strong impact of biodiversity on
innovations leads to the conjecture that its option value could be very high.
However, a numerical calculation might be restricted to regional options (e.g.
Krutilla et al. (1972)) but non-applicable to the world-wide biodiversity.
In principle, natural scientists could calculate the number of existing
plant and animal varieties as a measure of biodiversity although - as we
experienced in the past - there remains a significant portion to be disclosed at
least in the oceans and the tropical forests. Biodiversity is not separable
according to individual varieties which sum up to a total effect. The survival
conditions of plants and animals are highly interdependent and render any
isolated in-situ-treatment of a specific plant or animal illusory. The lack of
knowledge concerning the feed-backs and the degree of biodiversity are
locked them in. If these scientists succeed in breaking the irreversibility constraint,
the biodiversity resources represent an exhaustible resource which is relatively, but
no longer absolutely scarce. Then, the costs of preservation must be compared with
the costs of restoring. The scientific efforts to overcome the irreversibility originate
from the expected absolute scarcity in the same way as the development of backstop
technologies originated from the prospected absolute scarcities of fossil fuels (see
for the basic concept of backstop technologies Nordhaus (1973)).responsible for a great extent of uncertainty surrounding any biodiversity
management. Even worse, the conflict does not only arise by the extreme
uncertainty with respect to the change in numbers. For instance, a number x
representing biodiversity as the survival of x species is hardly exchangeable
against another state of biodiversity also containing x species which are at
least partially not identical to the first one. In economic terms, we are not only
lacking a kind of "biodiversity production function" but also a vector of
weights which should be given to the specific components, i.e. the varieties, of
biodiversity and a corresponding aggregation rule.
However, the negotiation sessions which prepared the Earth Summit
demanded to establish an expert group which should deal with the
determination of the ecological, economic, aesthetic and cultural value of
biological diversity. Such an economic assessment of the benefits and of the
corresponding costs could in principle lead to the determination of an
"optimum" rate of depletion (which could be zero). Observing the dispute
among cost-benefit-specialists, it would have been very interesting for
environmental economists to learn how the expert group accomplished the
assessment. Baumol and Oates (1971) assumed Herculean proportions already
for problems which can be considered as ridiculous in terms of complexity
compared to the assessments of biodiversity's benefits.
If appropriately defined in economic terms, sustainability with respect to
biodiversity embraces a lot of the option value ideas. A sustainable
development is intended to save the regeneration ability of nature because
extinction does not only bear the risk of unknown side-effects but also the risk
of the loss of unknown future benefits. It is noteworthy that a sustainable
development does not necessarily indicate that all resource extractions should
be fixed on a certain degree that does not change the resource stock. A concept
of sustainable development should take resource-conserving investments into
account, too, because accompanying measures can ameliorate the regeneration
ability and allow a higher rate of sustainable resource use (Pearce, Barbier,
Markandya(1990)).3. The Economics of an Environmental Fund
An environmental fund aims at an effective enforcement of global
environmental objectives. Even if one assumes that an expert group were able
to solve the above mentioned assessment problems, an outcome in form of a
complex value function is not workable. Instead, it would be hard enough to
agree upon concrete fixed objectives which appropriate measures and
regulations should meet. From the point of view of theoretical elegance, fixed
standards assume a value function which assigns a constant positive utility to
just fulfilment and overfulfilment and an infinite negative utility to every non-
fulfillment. But the convention did not fix well-specified environmental
standards because such an overall strictness is hardly defensible on scientific
grounds and - even more important - hardly feasible in the political arena. The
industrial countries succeeded in integrating the support into the GEF and
rendered an expert group superfluous. Because the industrialized countries pay
the fund, they also dominantly control the agency which administers the fund
and enforces compliance with the environmental objectives. Contrary to the
ideas which the developing countries have brought in, the fund will only
support biodiversity-enhancing or -preserving projects. The fund does not
support mere preservation although financial transfers seemingly enjoy
superiority because they do not incur any welfare losses of misspecification
which originate from inferior information of the agency.
However, the additional problems which arise if financial transfers try to
regulate the use of biodiversity resources must also enter the academic
discussion. First of all, academic discussions often neglect the existence of a
severe information problem. Until now, scientists could record the history of
biodiversity easily because no incentives existed to manipulate domestic data
when biodiversity was no problem of scarcity and environmental concern.
When biodiversity will be financed by the developed countries, the well-
known lemon problem can arise (Akerlof (1970)). The agency faces two
problems in the case of financial transfers. On the one hand, several standards
and contingencies can only incompletely specify the contracted biodiversity
services. On the other hand, the control costs to ensure full compliance can be
prohibitively high for some environmental protection issues. This may not be
the case for tropical forests because satellite data can easily monitor and verifyprotection. But whenever protection must take place in areas which are also
subject of agricultural or industrial use, monitoring problems arise because the
control parameter "no human activity" which is suitable for wildlife protection
cannot serve as an indicator.
The sovereignty of countries which are contract partners also restricts the
control options. It is rational for every country to exploit an eventually given
discretionary margin and deviate from the agreed-upon protection of
biodiversity. Therefore, countries provide only lemons, i.e. low-quality
protection, in the case of severe control problems because the agency cannot
distinguish and reward high-quality protection measures. These discretionary
margins are a function of the degree of information asymmetries and the
credibility of contract breach sanctions by the agency in the case of detection.
The sovereignty of the developing countries leaves only the threat of changing
the contract partner to the agency. If the environmental criteria are very
detailed with respect to regions, even these contract breach sanctions are
incredible because - ex definitione - the respective biodiversity cannot be
provided by another region. If there is no regional specification, the agency can
shrink but not completely eliminate the discretionary margin.
Whether the financial transfers just cover the incremental costs is more a
question of the bargaining powers of the agency and the country than a
question of the convention's text. The bargaining power of the developing
countries depends crucially on the regional specification of objectives. For
example, if a certain area of tropical forest is to be protected and the site of the
forests does not play any role, developing countries compete for the fund
resources. At first glance, the necessary transfers are likely to cover solely the
incremental costs unless collusion among forest-owners is workable. On the
contrary, a very detailed regional specification of standards renders every
developing country a monopolist who will be able to skim the bargaining
gains. Hence, from the point of view of the industrialized countries, a more
general project-supporting fund is at least cheaper.
But even in the case of no regional specification, rent-seeking can result
in a bilateral monopoly unless the fund's allocation rule can prevent such an
outcome by simulating a negatively sloped demand curve for biodiversity or
environmental preservation. Consider a country i which owns Tf units of aglobal environmental resource, say T£-• km" tropical forests. If biodiversity
concerns do not matter for i, this country could use this area more beneficial by
siting agriculture, industrial facilities, etc. These alternative uses are the
opportunity costs for i in the case of environmental protection and define the
preservation cost function C^Tj) which exhibits increasing marginal costs
because land is by and large a fixed factor.
Any auctioning mechanism which is based on sealed bids obviously
conflicts with political feasibility. Therefore, suppose on the agency's side a
very simple (and basically very naive) allocation procedure: in every period, a
constant specific amount of money, F, which should at least be able to protect
an area of size T endows the agency. The agency asks the forest-owning
countries to convey offers of at least, say, also T which specify the area of
preservation and the corresponding demanded compensation.
4 Offers will be
common knowledge contrary to the underlying cost functions and the agency
prefers the "cheapest" offers which exploit the fund, i.e. the set of offers which
seemingly maximizes the preservation area. Because I am only interested in a
first sketch of allocation problems, I focus on i's possible strategies and present
no explicit equilibrium analysis.
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Preservation of area T at the expense of F reflects the monopolistic
outcome. Because the marginal revenues with respect to preservation are zero,
an exclusive supplier of an environmental resource will just meet the
reservation level T and exploit the whole fund if the costs are lower than F. If
there are several countries, country i could still try to reap the whole fund by
offering more and more preservation in the competition until it reaches its
resource limit Tf. Then, i's implicit price which is the ratio of the fund
resources F to the increasing preservation level T£- follows a declining path.
A strategy that seeks to absorb the whole fund faces also strictly
decreasing profits. But a successful absorption of the fund by just one country i
is equivalent to a future monopolistic bargaining position. If the discount rate r{-
4 This minimum offer should guarantee a minimum coherent area of tropical forests
which is able to safeguard biodiversity services.
5 I will present a comprehensive approach of a fund-based preservation game in
another paper.10
of i is sufficiently low, it could pay to bear even large losses today to gain
monopoly power tomorrow. Biodiversity destruction means irreversibility so
that every country which the fund does not compensate will use the areas of
tropical forests for other purposes which will rule out biodiversity forever-. In
such a case, i is able to realize the combination (T,F) in all subsequent periods
because it remains the exclusive supplier of the specific biodiversity resource.
This irreversibility does not apply to preservation policies with respect to
carbon dioxide. Reforestation is able to build up a new stock of carbon-
dioxide-binding resources but cannot restore the destroyed biodiversity.
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Let (Ty,F) be the combination when the fund just covers the costs of
preservation. Then there exists a range until (T;',F) is reached in which the
rent-seeking strategy will still be able to provide positive present profits. Two
subsets divide the range of (T;,F) with Tj' < Tf. a set which guarantees positive
or zero discounted profits and a set of negative discounted profits, each
including expected future monopoly gains. If Tf is a binding constraint, the
last set is empty. A rent-seeking country i will offer levels of preservation
which exploit the whole fund until it either reaches its resource capacity or
faces zero discounted profits. If it reaches this "maximally fully fund-
exploiting offer" and a competitor conveys a cheaper bid, i's next price-
reducing bids will leave the set of maximally fund-exploiting offers because i
knows that he has lost the monopoly race.
7 Different last maximally fund-
exploiting bids accrue to different discount rates, to different national resource
endowments and to different opportunity cost functions. The marginal costs at
the minimum offer level T determine country i's final offer after it has left the
competition for the monopoly prize.
Suppose that country j has made its last fund-exploiting offer in a two-
country-case while i is still able to calculate positive discounted profits. Then,
the winning offer of i which reaps the whole fund must be a little bit lower in
the implicit price than the marginal costs of j at T. No cheaper bid of j will
But note also the reservation of footnote 3.
This analysis mirrors only a specific variant of the possible games with respect to
the information partitions of the players. I implicitly assume that the cost functions
are common knowledge among the resource countries (which implies that the first
offer is directly the winning one) or that the participants learn them quickly.11
follow this bid. Assume that the agency pays compensations at the beginning
of every time period when the participants have made their offers and that all
bidding stages for every time period have no temporal meaning in terms of
delay costs and the like (Fudenberg, Tirole (1991): 70 ff.). In the case~of an
infinite time horizon, if there exists a non-empty set of T^s which fulfil
7 \ /
F - C±(Tj_) + — > 0 and
ri
F dC7-
i will choose the lowest T^ of this set because future gains overcompensate
temporary losses and i is a monopolist in the present and all subsequent
periods.
8 It is noteworthy that not necessarily the lowest-cost-country will win
this race - if it comes to such an end - because a sufficiently low rate of
discount can outweigh cost inferiority. So besides low-cost-countries also
"patient" countries can hope to be awarded the monopoly prize.
Lower minimum offers avoid such an outcome because they render the
success of a rent-seeking strategy much more unlikely. However, there may
exist specific minimum thresholds for biodiversity preservation so that this
option can fail to cure the rent-seeking results. Alternatively, the agency could
commit to contract with a minimum number of countries or to fix a minimum
price to avoid a high future dependency on one country. Both strategies have to
keep the irreversible loss of areas in countries which are not compensated in
mind so that the structure of the game will differ in the second period from that
one in the first. In the model, irreversibility diminishes the set of potential
participants in the second period even if the agency can avoid dominant rent-
seeking. Hence, this exit game is much more complex than the comparably
simple task to avoid the exploitation of the fund by one country in the first
period. Uncertainty will increase this complexity because different private
If all but one country have dropped down their rent-seeking strategy but the
remaining one cannot meet the marginal costs of the last T-supplier, T-offers until
marginal costs are reached are not optimal because they would leave wind-fall
profits to the last maximally fund-exploiting bidder.12
information partitions induce different strategies of offers and - eventually
even unpaid - preservation policies. Because the countries are likely to
anticipate or at least to speculate about the future constellations of participants,
no general financial allocation mechanism of a given fund can - be
recommended on purely theoretical grounds. Also long-term contracts are not
suitable to prevent an exploitation of the fund donors because there exists no
international legislation which can enforce future compliance.
These impediments do not indicate that any effort of an international
fund and a corresponding agency is useless. But the outcome is not likely to
meet the results of theoretical elegance when information problems and
irreversibilities are absent. The more detailed the biodiversity claims are the
worse is the bargaining power of the industrialized countries already in the first
period, but the less dominant are the lemons. However, the majority of the
industrialized countries preferred and pushed through an integration into the
GEF. The GEF supports already several projects of biodiversity preservation
which have proven to enhance the environmental quality. This control serves
as an effective second-best substitute for a first-best allocation rule which
meets the requirements of a consistent pricing rule for international
environmental services. The GEF does not reward the mere retainment of
environmental resources and is therefore no subject of strategies which try to
build-up a monopolistic bargaining position. The industrialized countries can
expect a higher degree of efficacy because the GEF devotes resources only to
projects which improve the conditions of biodiversity so that sovereignty
issues cannot conflict with long-run sustainability.
However, whether the GEF will succeed to preserve an essential part of
biodiversity resources is in doubt. The project conditionality shrinks the
possibility set of measures which achieve a stabilized stock of biodiversity
resources because projects are no necessary condition for preservation. The
irreversibility urges the international environmental policy to find a general
pricing rule for biodiversity services which overcomes the limited possibilities
of mere project-related support. The stability and the irreversibility aspects
recommend a bilateral bargaining between an agency and every developing
country. Every contract should package several environmental services to
avoid a rent-seeking outcome and future instability. Irreversibility and the risksBibhothek
des Inst-ituts f Or Weltwirtschc
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of rent-seeking call for a minimum number of participating countries at the
expense of the cheapest-bid-rule.
Environmentalists suspect the project-related support to build up_ long-
run strategic advantages for the industrialized countries which will shrink the
bargaining power of developing countries. They accuse this strategy as a kind
of "neo-colonialism". In Rio, the small number of industrialized countries and
the tight links among them in other fields of mutual concern allowed them to
form a workable interest group although the Bush administration refused to
cooperate. Opposed to this cohesion, the developing countries differ strongly in
their preferences with respect to the financial support for the preservation of
different global environmental resources. Hence, it was a natural outcome that
an international institution which is commonly controlled by the industrialized
countries and performs like a monopolist is likely to reap all the bargaining
gains because the competition among the developing countries allows the GEF
to cover merely incremental costs.
Additionally, if the agency also succeeded to finance a substantialpart of
essential projects, the industrialized countries were able to improve their future
bargaining position. If in, say, ten years the developed countries will agree
upon a specific degree of environmental preservation, a credible threat to stop
the financial aid for projects which are also essential for the economic
development could enforce compliance with these objectives. Compliance
could be enforceable when this threat is credible because fund resources could
be easily redevoted to other environment-enhancing projects. The developing
countries' representatives could prefer this financial support today at the
expense of a worse bargaining position tomorrow if they discount the future
very strongly. Modern bargaining theory has demonstrated that comparably
high discount rates lower the bargaining power coefficient of the generalized
Nash bargaining outcome (Binmore, Rubinstein, Wolinsky (1986)). The real
biodiversity game would be played in the future while the industrialized
countries invest in their bargaining power during the preplays. However, this
subtle conjecture can only turn out as true if the essential local environmental
problems of developing countries are closely linked to the global problems
which are the main concern of the industrialized countries. One cannot observe
such links today and thus cannot call the GEF-like support of projects a "neo-14
colonialisrrT-strategy. However, the potential impact of discounting on the Rio
outcome should not be overlooked.
4. The Economic Implications of A Preferential Technology
Access
The preferential technology access to biotechnological inventions
represents the other keystone of the compensations laid down in the
convention. Preferential access means that the developing countries will be
able to circumvent at least partially the licence fees for biotechnology products
or processes without risking direct retaliation through trade policies. Many
inventions in the biotechnology industry originate from a long-term and very
cost-intensive research on genetic materials which is provided by global
environmental resources. The regulation by patents and intellectual property
rights responds directly to imitative activities which can destroy incentives to
create of new products and production processes. Actually, very little is known
about the very nature and the determinants of innovations. Today, economists
accept that a workable innovation process is only possible at the expense of the
competitive performance on the product markets. An innovation must be able
to gain a specific lead rent which at least covers the sunk costs of research and
development. Hence, a too high degree of competition on the market for
biotechnological products conflicts with an eventually more valuable barrier
which shelters monopoly rents and encourages beneficial innovation efforts.
The observation of positive externalities supports the hypothesis of positive
social benefits of specific barriers to entry: in highly innovative industries,
innovations themselves obviously encourage further innovations which were
impossible without the basic invention.
Patents try to cure the disincentive which originates from uncompensated
imitations on basically free markets by excluding the threat of a free-of-charge
imitation for a certain period. However, patents can only serve as an
incomplete instrument (see for the following e.g. Scherer, Ross (1990)). First
of all, any legislation is not able to differentiate appropriate expiry dates for
different innovations. But then the discounted research and development costs
will meet the discounted monopolistic net gains of an innovation only by
chance exactly. Additionally, an information-inferior agency must decide on
the acceptance of an innovation to be patented. It cannot be ruled out that15
applications for patents do not originate from the development of a new
product or technology but rest on the assumption that this patent will erect a
barrier to entry for competitors. On the contrary, "inventing-around" can easily
circumvent the patent law. Additionally, the efficiency of patents depends not
only on the date of expiry but also on the specific licensing rules which are laid
down in the patent law. -
The industrial organization's literature cannot provide any general and
unambiguous result whether a specific patent protection and corresponding
royalties lead to an over- or underoptimal protection of innovations. Thus, it is
by no means clear whether an obligation to transfer patent-protected
biotechnologies on a preferential basis to developing countries will imply a
further harmful disincentive for the introduction of highly beneficial
innovations or will efficiently reap overoptimal rents if compensations are not
sufficient. Because the biotechnology industry - attributed to high future
growth rates - is still in its infancies with respect to their innovation abilities, I
refrain from an ad-hoc assertion.
The contractors of the biodiversity convention will face the same
problems when they have to determine the degree of compensations. Firms
which receive compensations for the provision of biotechnological innovations
have superior though no certain knowledge with respect to research and
development as well as the market potentials of their products. Hence, they are
likely to exaggerate the demanded compensations in order to earn extra rents.
An authority deciding on the compensations runs the danger to induce a future
cut of innovation efforts in the case of a coercive transfer when compensations
fall short of the industry's demand. Alternatively, the authority has to devote a
huge amount of compensations in the case of voluntary transfers to guarantee
an - eventually even free-of-charge - preferential access which developing
countries can finance. Because no market prices for intellectual property rights
exist, a subsidization of technology transfers will unavoidably incur severe
information problems unless this part of the agreement degenerates to a simple
declaration of intent by granting too low subsidies. Additionally, a preferential
access which constitutes an artificial comparative advantage does not exploit
the potentials of a scarcity-based division of labour.16
Even if the developing countries had the human capital capabilities to run
biotechnology facilities, the industrialized countries could retaliate against an
aggressive expansion strategy by the imposition of trade barriers on those
biotechnology products which developing countries plan to export. Subtle
product standards can easily close the still expanding market for
Pharmaceuticals for developing countries.
5. Preferential Technology Access and Biodiversity
A preferential technology access constitutes an in-kind-transfer contrary
to a fund which pledges to pay financial transfers for mere preservation. In-
kind-payments can play the same stabilizing role in international
environmental agreements like the project-linked financial support of the GEF
if they directly induce environmental protection. These stability aspects can
justify cooperation in the field of biodiversity-friendly and biodiversity-
enhancing technologies. However, donors which benefit from stability instead
of receivers normally initiate in-kind-transfers. Rational receivers can be better
off by financial transfers because they can satisfy their desires without
considerable welfare losses which originate from the transaction costs of a
reallocation.
Contrary to this conclusion, the developing countries suggested the
preferential access. Strong political pressure of potential biotechnology users
could have motivated this preference. But an issue-linking-strategy which
originates from the parallel GATT negotiations explains this suggestion better.
The GATT negotiations which some of the developed countries initiated deal
generally with the acquisition of patents and intellectual property rights. The
developed countries believe that the non-acknowledgement of patents and
other intellectual property rights in other countries results in the worse
performance of some of their industries on international markets. Hence, the
industrialized countries are targeting a world-wide protection of their
innovations but deny any compensation for the origin country which provides
genetic material (see Acharya (1991) for details).
The purpose of the convention is not a doubtful efficiency-enhancement
of the innovative performance of the biotechnology industries by coercive or
strongly subsidized voluntary technology transfers. Contrary to the17
establishment of the fund, a preferential access gains basically nothing in terms
of the protection of biodiversity. The fact that also developing countries
directly experience a further reduction of the world-wide genetic basis does not
induce a retainment of biospheres. Every developing country has the option to
destroy its domestic genetic basis and to rely on a free-rider-ticket which
assumes a sufficient provision by other countries, too. Even worse, if the
royalties for developing countries fall extremely short of the R&D costs and
biodiversity-friendliness cannot be always guaranteed, an overintensive use of
biodiversity-destroying biotechnologies could significantly endanger the
effectiveness of a fund.
In a recent paper, Swanson (1992) proposes to establish international
informational property rights. These informational property rights resemble
intellectual property rights and should compensate resource owners for the
"identified usefulness of unmodified natural resources". However, a system of
informational property rights would face insurmountable obstacles. On the one
hand, the very nature of innovations leaves the information which genetic basis
was used exclusively to the innovators. On the other hand, several
environmental resources offer the same genetic potential because genetic
potentials can inhabit different species. Hence, an ageny could not create
unambiguous informational property rights because the agency cannot
determine the original biodiversity resource which implied the invention.
The issue-linking strategy of developing countries as a respond to the
GATT negotiations should make the industrialized countries reconsider their
trade policies if they are really interested in sustainability and biodiversity. The
developing countries are facing a lot of severe trade barriers, especially for
agriculture and manufactured goods. The issue linking strategy seems to
originate from the talks about intellectual property rights and the reluctance of
several developed countries to abolish trade barriers. The demand of a
preferential access seems to stem from the GATT round which is likely to
improve the conditions for the industrialized countries by a tighter protection
of knowledge but also probably misses to open markets which are decisive for
the developing countries. Environmental agreements will suffer the burdens of
unsolved conflicts of international trade policies as long as these countries areIS
merely treated as resource suppliers which are prohibited to compete in the
markets for agricultural and manufactured goods.
It is of course illusory to hope for a new order of international trade
before internationally coordinated efforts to protect biodiversity should be
started. At best, a preferential access will eventually not alter the effectiveness
of the fund. A specific fund-raising mechanism could increase this
effectiveness. Governments could impose a special tax on biodiversity
industries which pays the fund at least partially because biotechnology
industries benefit from a retainment of biodiversity. The biotechnology
industries and the governments could comprise the control authorities of the
agency. Because these industries have superior knowledges of any contract
breach with respect to their biodiversity needs and a strong incentive to reveal
these informations, the agency can cope with non-compliance more effectively.
However, the agency will still face information problems to detect a
deterioration of biodiversity which is not directly harmful for innovations but
for the biosphere and the human living conditions in general. As we experience
that fairness aspects often dominate environmental decision making (Stahler
(1991)), the reluctance to bias detection possibilities in favour of an industry is
likely to prevent such a mechanism.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Compared to a global climate policy, biodiversity seems to represent a
more urgent challenge for the world community. Although a delay of effective
international cooperation with respect to global change may be very costly, the
costs of restoring biodiversity seem to be infinite. Hence, international
environmental policies should focus more on problems of biodiversity and
ecosystems but the results of Rio are not in that way promising. This paper has
indicated that the potential benefits of a retainment of the present in-situ-stock
may be very large even if preservation policy concentrates solely on the
impacts for biotechnological industries and agriculture. The paper has also
demonstrated that the project-related support is principally able both to
guarantee a certain degree of preservation and to avoid administration
problems which originate from information asymmetries and rent-seeking. The
project-related control of environment-friendliness can serve as an effective
second-best instrument unless a general pricing rule for different international19
environmental services is available. But the creation of an effective pricing rule
is a very urgent challenge with respect to biodiversity.
Additionally, the planned biotechnology transfer which developing
countries brought into the discussion limits the efficacy of the Rio agreement.
The organization of such a technology transfer will face a lot of severe
problems because these transfers make no sense in terms of preservation and
are likely to endanger beneficial innovative efforts in the developed countries.
This potential drawback gave reason for the U.S. government not to join the
agreement. This transfer originates from the GATT negotiations which are
likely to introduce an international shelter for intellectual property rights. But
the chances that trade barriers for the developing countries will be abolished
are low. So the biodiversity agreement has to bear the problems of unsolved
trade conflicts and those of a too low degree of participation. It remains an
open question whether the industrialized countries will accept a change in their
trade policies or whether they will sacrifice future innovations to protect their
domestic agriculture and some of their old and cost-inferior industries.
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